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INTRODUCTION
In a series of articles and most recently in his book Can God Be Frce?,
villiam Rowe has argued that the traditional theistic view of the nature of
God is fundamentally incoherent. In panicular, Rowe believes that:
(i) God is essentidly omnipotent,(ii) God is essentially omniscient,(iii) God is essentially perfectly good, and(iv) God creates freely
constiture an inconsistent tetrad. Furthermore, Rowe argues, the theist
should not be prepared to give up (iv) because if God's 
"re"iirr. acrs are norfree, thgn Ggd is notpraisewonhy and it is not the case that God is properly
thanked for his goodness towards his creatures. In dris paper, I'll e*amine
Rowe's argumem for this inconsistency. while there is little doubt drat
rhere is a prima facie problem here for the classical theist, Rowe's argument
can be shown to be unsuccessful, or so I will argue. In tle next seJtion of
this paper, I will expound Rowet position. Having done that, I will explain
the three wap I think the argument is vulnerable. The three sections-afrer
that will be dedicated to giving each objection its voice.
I. ROIOTE'S ARGUMENT
lowe b9grn1 his discussion by considering rhe correspondence between
Gottried Leibniz and Samuel clarke in which, among other things, the two
Thanls to Eric Funkhouser and Barry Vard for helpfirl conversations,
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eminent philosophers discuss the nature of divine freedom and its relation
to creation. In what turns out to be a crucial component of his overall
argument, Rowe writes the following:
Following Iribm?. we can imagine God considering a variety of worlds he mi-ght
create. one 
-bht b. a world in which there are no conscious cfennues at all, a
world composed solely of dead marter. Another might be a world composed {at
some stage in its history) of living, conscious cr€i$ures whose lives are meaningfirl,
morallv !ood, a"d happy. Assume, as seems evident, that the second world is the
ben., wJdd . .. If God were limited to these rwo worlds, he would fice t-hree choices:
creating the inferior world, creating the superior worf{, greating ng world at all. For
God to-decide to create no world wer creating a world that is' all things considered,
a very good world, would be for God to do less than dre best that he can do. If
,o, it'6-. that God's perfect goodness would requirehimto cr€ate the very good
world. But ifGod's perfect goodness requires him to create the very good world,
rather than creating the inferior world, or not creadng a world at dl, what are we
to make of that pin of the idea of God that declares that he created the world
feety? To oy ttot God' frecly created the go:{ *9tld :*ms to imply that le-wash* ro. ao io ,o, that he could have created the inferior world, or refrained from
creating either world. But if his perfect goodness 
,requires him to create the good
worl4 -how is it possible that he was free to create the inferior world or not to create
any world? This is a simple way of picturing the problem of divine perfection and
divine freedom.r
A few pages later, Rowe states his Leibnizian afgument somewhat more
formally:
IARG 1l:
1. If God exists and is omnipotent, perfectly wise and perfecdy good, then
he chooses to create the best of dl possible worlds.
2. God exists and is omnipotent, perfectly wise and good'
Therefore,
3. God chooses to creete the best of all possible worlds'2
In order ro get a good handle on Rowe's overall argumenr, rwo points need
to be made.
First, as the argument stands, the conclusion is not a threat to divine
freedom. For it sals only that God will choosethe best world, not that God
nust choosethe best world (or that, necessarily, God will choose the best
world). Although in the text it is dear that Rowe understands the prgmises
ro be not 
-"r.Iy true bur necessarily uue, rhe fact that this isn't explicit in
r Rowe(2004: t2-13). 2 Rowe(2OM:16).
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the premises as they appear in the arg'ment is problematic. so let's make
their modnl status explicit as follows:
IARG 2]:
l. Necessarily, if God exists and is omnipotenr, perfectly wise and perfectly
good, then he chooses ro creare the best ofali possibie worlds.
2. Necessarily, God exists and is omnipotent, peifectly wise and good.
Therefore,
3. Necessarily, God chooses ro creare tlre best of all possible wodds.
Although this version of the argument does give us a conclusion that is
plausibly inconsistent with divine crearive freedom, its weakness is thar it
works only against the theist who accepts God's necessary existence and
essencial omnipotence, wisdom, and goodness. However, none of these
assumptions are cenral to the main thread of Rowe's argument. Here,s a
version in the spirir of the kibniz/Rowe argumenr th*tioe, not depend
on the modally strengthened theistic claims:
IARG 3]:
1. Necessarily, if God exists and God exemplifies omnipotence, perfect
wisdom, and perfect goodness in a stable manner, the'God .holr"s to
create the best creatable world in every world accessible to God.
2. God exists and God exemplifies omnipotence, perfectly wisdom, and
perfect goodness in a stable manner.
3- Therefore, God chooses to creare the best creatable world in everyworld
accessible to God.
4' If s does X in every world accessible to s, then s doesn't do X freely.
5. Therefore, God doesn't freely bring about the best creatable world.
The. argument depends 1n the idea of a being's having a properry in astable m^anner. Property P is stable for a bein{B 
"t " iorld Vz in"(") nexemplifies P at dl times in \7a and (b) rherc iJ nothing B can do ,o *"L.it the case that B ceases to exempfi$' P in V. put somJwhat dif,cerently, if
a person has a properry in a sraLrle way, there are no wodds accessibre roher in which she doesn't have 
i1. Exemplifying a properry in a stable wayis' for all practical p'rposesJ as limiting as h".'ilg itr*i prop..ry or*.iJt].
For example, suppose that in world W, nay hasih. ,t"bl.'6,,, accidentj)
- 
l,In order ,o T3k propely srabiliw friendly ro aremporaliss, rhe first condirion
trffi ,Tff as : (r) b exemplifies p in $fl and there is no rinre whcn B fails ro exenr-
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properry of being blind. Then not only does Ray not see-Ray canl seein
'W, 
even *rough there are other worlds in which Ray has 20120 vision.
The second point that should be made about Rowe's kibnizian argumenr
is that it presupposes that there is a besr of all possible worlds.a But it is by
no means obvious that such an assumption is right. For ir's epistemically
possible that rather than there being a single best world, there is an infinite
hierarchy of better worlds so that for any world, there is a world better. In
such a case, one might suppose, God's hands are not tied by his perfect
goodness.'We will go into more detail about this in a subsequent scction,
but for now the point needs to be made that Rowe's broader argumenr
doesn't depend on this controversial assumption. For Rowe contends that
if there is no best world, then there is another serious problem lurking: God
might be free but God wouldn't be perfectly good. For, if there is no best
world, then for any world that God creates there is a berter world that God
could have created. And if God creates a wodd when there is a better world
that God could have created instead, then God could have done better
than he did. But if God could have been better than he did, then he is not
perfectly good.
Here, then, is Rowe's broader argument (although this pardcular present-
ation is mine):
[ARG 4]:
l. Either there is a best world or there is an infinite hierarchy of better
worlds
2. If there is a best world, then the Creator is not free with respect to either
creating at all or creating the world he creates.
3. lf there is an infinite hierarchy of better worlds, then the Creator is not
perfectly good.
Cl. Therefore, either the Creator is not free or he is not perfectly good.
4. Tbe Creator is God only if the Creator is a perfectly good being.
C2. Therefore, either God doesn't exist or the Creator is not perfectly free.
This argument is valid. In the sections that follow, we shall have a look at
each of the premises ofARG 4. \7e will begin with the fourth premise and
work backward.
{ For tlosc farniliar with what Alvin Plantinga (1974: Ch.9) calls 'leibniz's Lapse',
the above argument doesn't crucially depend on the claim that God is able to bring about
the best possible world. For Rowe's purposes, it is enough that there is a best feasible
world, i.e., a best world that God is able to actualize. Having made this point, I will now
ffffi|1f ignore it and speak as drough if there is best possible world, God can bring
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To deny this is akin to thinking that when a child at age four conceives
of her parents as all-knowing and morally perfect, and then at age seven
has those illusions dashed, she should conclude that Mom and Dad don't
exist. But that, of course, is silly. karning of her parents' fallibiliry does
not make her an orphan. Now, of course, Rowe doesn't think that if his
argument is successfrrl, he's shown that there is no Creator of Heaven and
Eanh, but only that there is no 'God'. So in a sense, my point is, as they
say, 'merely semantic'. However, when philosophers conclude that there is
no God because they take themselves to have shown that no being could
have one or more of the properties historicdly attributed to God, thgv are
gaining a rhetorical advanmge they have not earned in the argument thqrve
provided.
III. PREMISE THREE-IF THERE IS AN INFINITE
HIERARCHY OF BETTER'STORLDS, THEN GOD
IS NOT PERFECTLY GOOD
One might be tempted to respond to Rowe's Leibnizian argument by
claiming drat there is no reason to think that there is a best world. For all
we know, there might be an infinite hierarchy of very good worlds. If so,
God would presumably have the freedom to create from among the infinite
set of very good worlds. If God decides that it is bemer to create than not
ro create, and God recognizes that there is a hierarchy of infinitely many
very good worlds, then God will freely chose from among those possible
creadons. Hence God's creative freedom is secured by an infinite hierarchy
ofvery good wodds.
Not so fut, thinks Rowe. If the Creator were to create a very good world
in such a circumstance, then the Creator is not God. \7hy not? Because a
perfectlygood beingwill always do the best that it is able to do. However, in
the above circumsmnce, no mafter how good a world tlte Creator produces,
he will not have done his best since there will be infinitely many better
worlds that he could have created but chose not to. Rowe's precise statement
ofhis crucial principle is this (Rowe calls it'Principle B'):
If an omniscient being creates a world when there is a bemer world it could
have created, then it would be possible for there to be a being morally bener
than it.8
Such a being would not be perfectly good because it isn't possible for there
to be a being better than a perfectly good being. Therefore, ifthere is an
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II. PREMISE FOUR-'THE CREATOR IS GOD ONLY
IF THE CREATOR IS PERFECTLY GOOD'
'we will spend considerably more time on the 6rst t}ree steps of the
argument than we will on this founh premise. Although Rowe doesn't state
the premise in quite this way, the text makes it clear rhat he is commimed ro
it as sated in 4.:'s?hat he has in mind is plain and common in the circles
rg whic! analytic philosophers of religion ru* In as much as the concept of
God is the concept of a being with all perfections, and perfect goodnk is
a perfection, then if there is no perfecdy good being then there is no God,
i.e.' God doesn'r exist. However, there is something very anificiar about all
this. For my_money, thele are two good, related options for deciding the
conrent of 'God' and neither entails that if there is no perfectly good b-eing,
then there is no God. First, we might treat 'God' as a prop.r-rrr-., 
"ndthen if the theist is a Kripkean direct reference-theorist about names (as I
think she should be), she'll think that the term has reference bur no sense.
And the reference will be secured by an initial baptism rhat dates back to
the ancient Hebrews, and a successful causal chain ihat links up that (those)
baptismd acs with our current use.
Alternatively, the dreist might think of 'God' as a kind term. It is
presumably something like this that Rowe has in mind when he says if
*":. i: .no. ggrfec.tlf good being tllen God doesn,t exist: nothing is of thedivine kind if nothing is perfectly good. Now I think the most.ri'trrrd *"y
olmat<ing sense of the way standaid theists (as opposed to philosophers of
religion) understand 'God'when they aren't using the ..r* 
". 
a nrm. is
again along Iftipkean lines: God is a supernatural kind with the intensional
contenr of the term 'God' being like 'the personal crearor who revealed
fim11t{t9 the Hebrew people',6 and with the extension being fixed (again)in a lGipkean, causd manner.T
- 
As I said, though, I think'God'is generally used as a name byworshippers
in churches, synegogues, and mosques. OF course, it is true th"t th"ists
mafte lots ofother claims about the essence or narure ofthis being, but none
ofthese assertions is such that'God'fails to refer ifone or moreLn,t t ue,
, 
5 For orample, Rowe (2oo4:89) writes: '[I]f the actual world is not the best world
rhat an omnipotent omniscient being could create, God does not exist.'6 As I have the intension stated, it does contain some descriptive content so thisisn t a. pure lftipkean theory. I take it that if the Hebrew prophets r rere sufferinq fromhallucinations, the causes ofwhich were the roors ofa typiofirrant they had conirmed,
we should think that the theistic G-od doesn't exisr, no, .i", ir'i, 
" 
t ar,ia".g.r:-**-7 For rnore on these issues, see Senor (1992).
8 Rowe (2004:89).
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infinite hierarchy of good worlds and the Creator chooses ro crear€ one of
them, the Creator is not God (who by definition is perfectly good).
Daniel and Frances Howard'Snyder have argued against Principle B
by telling a story comparing two creators who find themselves having to
choose among rhe infinitely many good wodds.e Jove and Juno both decide
that since among the very good worlds, every world is such that there are
infinitely many ve{F good worlds better than it, the only reasonable way ro
choose a particular world ro creare is to first create a randomizing device that
will choose among the very good worlds. Suppose, the Howard-snyders
suggest, we begin with the minimally good very good world and assign to it
the first positive integer and assign the second positive integer to the second
minimally good very good world and continue this way, thus maldng a
one-to-one correspondence between very good worlds and positive integers.
Jove uses the randomizing machine to choose the world to create, and it
spits otrt the number 777;Jove then creates that world. Juno's randomizer
spits out 999 and Juno creates that wodd. Now the Howard-Snyders argue
that Jove and Juno are morally equivalent since they have followed precisely
the same method for creating a world. The only difference benveen rhe two
concerns the results of the randomizing machine. But if that is correct, rhen
Principle B is false, since it would have us conclude straighraway that Jove
is not perfectly good.
Rowe agrees that Jove and Juno are morally equivalent, but he thinks
rhat neither one is morally perfect. Rowe contrasts Jove and Juno with
another god used in another example by the Howard-snyders (although
the example is amended by Rowe). Thor also ceares with rhe help of a
randomizer, but Thor's standard of minimal goodness in a world he might
create is higher than that of Jove and Juno. Worlds I 
-800 are deemed by
Thor as not good enough ro crerte given the infiniry of better worlds. So
Thor's randomizing device has world 801 as the least good world and the
machine selecrs world 888 for crearion. Rowe argues that even though the
world that Thor creates is inferior ro thar created by Juno, Thor is morally
superior to bothJove andJuno because Thor has a higher scandard ofworld
acceptabiliry; that is, some of the worlds deemed good enough to create by
Jove and Juno are deemed not good enough by Thor. Hence, Rowe insists,
Thor is better.
Better, but not morally perfect because Thor doesn't create the best world
he's capable of (he could have brought about any one of the worlds in dre
infinite hierarchy). Therefore, the bottom line is that Rowe thinks because
Principle B is correct, if there is an infinite hierarchy of good worlds, then
the Creator isn't perfecrly good so God doesn't exist.
There is a temPdng reply to Rowe's use of Principle B that-can be.found
(or is at l"".t rogg;"rt"I) in ihe writings of several Prominent philosophers'ro
ih" obl".tiorrT .oughly that il necessarily, there is no wey- to avoid
creatinjaworld than which there is a (creatable) better, then God's creating
, *orlj than which there is a better doesn't count tg?inst God's moral
perfection.
' There is a weaker and a stronger way to understand this claim. The
*.J., reading is that' in the circrlmsatrces described, God would not be
calpabh for crlting a srrrpassable world-that is, God doesn't do anything
f"i*hi.h he is to 6'lu-e.-H.r.'r the principle that could be appeded to in
support o[*lis claim:
Pl: If, S necessarily does X tlen S is not to blame for doing K
Although Rowe will grant the tru*r of Pl and its application to the case
i' q.r.Ji.rrr, the objeJtion understood this way isn't sufficiently strong as a
,oponr. to Rowe's argumenr. For, while never being culpable for an action
i, , n.."rr"ry conditiin for perfect goodness, it zurely isn't sufficienu that
is, perfect goodrr.ru is more than perfect blamelessness' Suppose Adolft
essential m-oral character is such that committing murder on a massive
scale is something he does at every world at which he has the chance. In
such a case, Adolf is not" to bhme for his murderous ways' So Rovre can
"c..pt Pf and 
insist that it poses no problem. for him: he isn't claiming that
in ,h" pr"r.nt 'no best *oild' r..n"tio God is bkmeworthy for-creating a
*orld .h*, is surpassable, but only that God is not morally perfect if God
does so.
The stronger reading of this objection is not subject to this response but
it also is ,rot"ro .learf right. According to the strong readin$' creating a
world that is not as gooi 
" 
world as the being might have created does
no. *ott. egunst ryuiect goodness when there is simply no way to avoid it'
Here's the general PrinciPle:
P2: If S necessarily does K then S's doing X does not count against S's
moral perfection.
Even apan from the considerations that drive us here, there is reason
f., J."!ii"g p2. Think back to Adolf. Although he can't be blamed for
ar, ..r"nti.liefect in his character, Adolf's having that essential defect
guarantees that he will never be completely- good at any given world'
Fo, h"rring a murderous character rulei out the possibiliry of moral per-
fecdon.
ro obiections alons these lines can be found in Hasker (fonhcoming); \(ainwright
(1999); Monis (1993)] and Kreuman (1990)'e Howard-Snvder (1994, 1996).
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ThatP2 is a fair understanding of the reasoning behind at least some of
those objecting in this manner can be seen clearly in this quotation from
Villiam l7ainwright (as quoted by Rowe):
But... a type of complaint which is dwap in place is never in place. A complaint
is only legitimate when the person whose conduct is criticized could have acted in
such a way that he or she would not be exposed to a complaint of that type.rl
Yet we see in the case ofAdolf that we should agree with the above sentiment
only when it is culpabiliry that is at issue. That a Person couldn't possibiliw
have avoided a bad course ofaction can show that the person is not perfectly
good even if she isn't blamewonhy for performing ic So what if we amend
the principle slightly to avoid cases like that ofAdolf, To wit'
P3: If in a given circumstance C, it is logically impossible for any Person
who 6nds herself in C to avoid taking a certain course of action A' then
doing A does not count against A's perfect goodness.
The problem with P3 is that without some helpful, further description
of C, ir is clearly false. For instance, suppos€ I have promised to return
your bicycle this afternoon, but having desperatelywanted to buy a couple
new games for my Xbox 360, I hawked it where upon it was immediately
misrakenly destroyed in a trash-compacting accident. Now no one in mY
circumstances would be able to avoid taking the course of action of failing
to give you back your bike after promising to return it. However, surely mv
being in this position couna against my being perfecdy good.
Suppose we were able to find a principle, call it 'P4' , in the spirit of P3
but that was apparendy unassailable. Would that settle the matter against
Rowe? Rowe doesn't think so. For suppose P4 is glus-i.s., that since God's
creating a world that is surpassable is necessary or unavoidable for anyone,
having created a surpassable world is not a sign of God's moral imperfecdon.
(Again, because doing what no one could possibly avoid c:ln count against
one's moral perfection.) Nevertheless, suppose there is an inGnite hierarchy
of worlds and that, as things go, God creates very good world Wl when he
could have created even-better world I$72 (or even-better-than-that world
l$73, etc.). Then God has done someching that is not necessary (create W'l)
and such that he could have done better (create world \72 or a better world
than thar). And this much seems undeniable. But if it is right, then given
Principle B (i.e., If an omniscient being creates a world when there is a
better world it could have created, then it would be possible for there to
be a being morally better than it), we get the conclusion that God is not
morally perfect (and hence is not God). In other words, Rowe wins.
rt must be granted ::f::;'::'*y"cant initiar 0,"**;;
However, as Rowe himself points out,r2 the plausibiliry of a principle must
be judged (at least in pan) by the plausibiliry of that with which it is
inconsistent. And if it is more plausible rlat the infinite hierarchy ofworlds
thesis is consistent with the possibiliry of a perfectly good, omnipotent
being than it is that Principle B is true, then we have some reason to doubr
the truth of the laner.
One point that Edward'Wierenga (2002) makes rather quicldy but
that I think deserves a more thorough hearing is the difference infinigv
makes.'SThereas Principle B might be very plausible giaen the existence of
a bat world (or worlds), when the possibiliry of an infinite hierarchy of
good worlds is introduced, its plausibiliry drops dramatically.l3 That this
should be the case isn't too surprising: the logic of infinite series is rather
different than that of finite series. To see this illustrated rather dramadcally,
let's briefy consider an exchange between \Tilliam lane Craig and Paul
Draper on the Kalam argument for God's existence.la Craig has argued
that there qrnnot be an actually infinite set of real objects because such
sets bring with them absurd consequeoces. Craig discusses Hilbert's Hotel
and other well-known implicadons of actual infinities. For example, if you
add a blue book to a set of infinitely many red bools, you end up with
a set with the 'same number of members' (i.e., infinitely many) that you
had before you added the blue book. Funhermore, if instead of adding a
single blue book, you were to add infinitely many blue boola to the set of
infinitely many red books, you'd still end up with a set of infinitely many
members even though that is precisely 'the number' of books you had in
the first place.
In his response, Draper claims that Craig's position amounm to noting
that the following triad of propositions is inconsistent, and to resolving the
inconsistency by rejecting the third. The propositions in question are:
S1: A set has more members than that contained by any of its proper
subsets.
52: If the members of fwo sets can be placed in a one-to-one correspond-
ence, then neither set has more members than the other.
53. There are adually infinite sets.
Each of these propositions is initially plausible. But when one sees that the
uuth of 53 implies that either Sl or 52 is false, one realizes that one of
these initially credible propositions will have to go. If we accept 53, th€n
we'll have to dump 51 and 52. Now the key to seeing how to reasonably
12 Rowe Q0M:120-l). rr Merenga (2002).tr Craig (2003) and Draper (2003).rr Rowe (2004: 118); taken frorn \Tainwright (1999:92).
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do this is to see that Sl and 52 are unquestionably true wben applied to
fnite sets. So we needn't deny either if we were to so limit their domains of
application to the finite.'\7hen we apply Sl and 52 to infinite sets, however,
we should immediately sense that sometiing is amiss because there isn't
a narural, rational or real numb€r thar is'the number of members'of an
infinite ser; rather the set contains infinitely many members. So if 'more'
means 'a greater number'then S1 is clearly false for infinite sers. However
as Draper"points out, there is surely a stiaight-forward intuitive ,.rrr" in
which, for the example, the set of all positive integers 'has more members'
than the set of euen positive integers; every member of the latter set is also a
member of the former set, bur the former ser has members that are not in
the latter set. Now if 'has more members' can be understood as 'has wery
member and then some', then we have a way of making sense of 51, and we
c:rn see that Sl is true even of infinire sers. However, on this understanding
of 'has more nrembers', 52 will turn out to be false. For the set of all positive
integers crn put into a one-to-one correspondence with the set of all even
positive integers even rhough the forrner clearly'has more members' in rhis
second sense ofthe phrase.
\7hat is the point of this aside into the Kalam argument and actual
infinities? I believe this provides us with a good illustration what's wrong
with Rowe's steadfast conviction that Principle B is true. Principles Sl
and 52 are not only prima facie plausible but are obviously uue if we
confine their domain to finite sets. However, if we assume the existence
of actually infinite sets, tlen they cannot both be true. My claim is that
som€thing similar is going on regarding Principle B. Suppose that there is
an omniscient Creator and a single best, creatable world. Now if in this
circumstance, the Creator fails to produce the best creaable world, then
he could have done better (i.e., made a better world) than he has in fact
done.'\Vhat could account for this?'S7ell, contrary to the claims of Roben
Adams and William !?ainwright, it can't be that tire perfectly good Creator
vdued something other than goodness/perfection in a world. For what
makes a world the be* uorld is its overall value and not simply is rnoral
goodness or general perfection; if there is a single best world, it will be
a world which exemplifies whatever or}rer goods an omniscient, perfectly
good being values. Given that the single best world is creatable by rhe
Creator, it would seem that the only explanarion for its not being produced
is a defect in the will of the Creator. He lacks the volition to do his best.
But if the Creator lacfts the volition to do his best, then he could have been
better (as Principle B says). Hence the Creator is not perfectly good in this
scenario.
Consider now the situation in which there is no best world but an infinite
hierarchy of very good worlds. If the Creator, recognizing his predicament,
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decides to use the Howard-Snyders' randomizing machine and thereby
produces a very good, but surpassable world, shall we say that he's done his
best? This is admittedly a hard question to answer unequivocally, and that is
because in these circumstances there is no such thingas doing one's best. On
the one hand, we might grant, this method for choosing a world to create
is, in principle, as good as can be had in the (necessary) circumstances; on
dre other hand, no matter what world dre machine randomly selects, the
Creator could have brought about a better world. Yet unlike the situation
in which there is a best world that the Creator nevertheless does not bring
about, the problem here isn't with his volition or nature. For he is aware
of his situation and so knows that it is logically impossible for him to
produce an unsurpassably good creation. And it is logically impossible for
him to do his best not because of an imperfect will or a faw in his essence,
but because of the enernd, necessary circum$ances. In this case, it is im-
possible for him to produce an unsurpassably good creation because it is
impossible for anyone in these necessary ciranmstances- including the being
fian which none greater is possible-to do it. Note that this is a different
point dran that which \07ainwright et. al. are making: they claim that ifdoing
X is not possible for a particular person, then that person's failure to do X
doesn't rule out her being perfectly good. But the Adolf example shows
fiis is mistaken. The principle I am appealing to is this: if doing X is
logically impossible even for a p€rson with a nature as mordly perfect as
is logically possible, then that person's hilure to do X doesn't rule our her
being perfectly good. Ifthere is an infinite hierarchy of increasingly good
wodds, then the creative product of a morally perfect (i.e., a perfectly good)
Creator will be surpassable. Thus, while Principle B is true if there is a best
world (or worlds), if there is an infinity of increasingly good worlds, then
rhis prima facie principle mrns out to be false.
IV. PREMISE T\TO-IF THERE IS A BEST TORLD,
THEN GOD IS NOT FREE \TITH RESPECT
TO EITHER CREATING AT ALL OR CREATING
TTIE WORLD GOD CREATES
\7e've already looked at the major component of the justification for the
premise; it is the Liebniz-inspired argument I have oudined three versions
of above. kt's focus on the second version, viz., ARG 2.
l. Necessarily, if God exists and is omnipotent, perfecdy wise and perfectly
good, then he chooses to cr€ate the best of all possible worlds.
2. Necessarily, God exists and is omnipotent, perfectly wise and good.
\
I
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Therefore,
3. Necessarily, God chooses ro creare the best of all possible worlds.
Note that the conclusion of this argumenr doesn'r explicitly say that God
is not free wirh respect to bringing abour rhe best of ali possible worlds. To
get that conclusion explicitly we need an additional premise:
4- rf God' necessarily chooses ro creare the best of all possible worlds, then
God doesn't freely choose ro create the best of all possible worlds.
The justificarion for this premise is given by Rowe in the following passage:
Thus far we have supposed with kibniz that among possible worlds there is one
that is best. And we have argued thar given God's absolute perfection, he would of
necessity create the besr world. Ifthe reasoning for this conclusion is correct, then
in the mamer of creadng among possible worlds, God cannot be &ee.rt
The point, then, is this: if God's creating rhe best world is necessary, rhen
God is not able to refrain from creating the best world (since jhere is
no wodd ar which God doesn't create rhe best world). But if one can'r
refrain^from a given acrion, then one isn't free with respect to that action.
Therefore, God isn't free wi*r respecr to creating the best wodd.
One mighr think that while it mighr be somewhat disappointing if it
turned our rhar God isn't free with respecr ro crearing, the theist coull give
up divine freedom with respect to creation withoui sacrificing anyth"ing
terribly significant. Rowe, however, disagrees. He thinls that if-God is not
frc9 yrrh r€spect ro crearion, then God isn't free generally. And, if God
isn't free, then God is not to be thanked for the good things God does, nor
is God worlbr of_praise since both thants and praise require the agent's
ability to refrain from the relevant acrions.r6 suiely, we mu$ agree-with
Rowe that if the necessiry of God's creating the best world entailsihat God
is neither to be thanked nor praised, then the necessity of God's creating
the best world would entail some substantial changes in the way the theisr
sees God.
There are, then, three questions that need addressing with regard to
the expanded ARG 2: (i) Does God's essential nature, tigether vlrt .t.
assumpdon that there is a single best creatable world entail that God will
bring about that world?; (ii) If the answer to (i) is .yes', does that imply that
God doesn't freely bring about that world?; and (iii) If that answerio both(i) and_(ii) is-'yes', does that imply that God is not to be *ranked or praised
for his beneficial actions?
15 Rowe (2OO4:74).
. 
,u 
-Ol Rowe (2004: 2), Rowe daims that if God is not &ee, then 
,it 
can be arsued,
that God is not praisewonhy, nor wonhy of our thanlis and graiitua.. --- -- --D-'-
rvA. Does God's nature 
€ntail that God will create the best if
there is a best?
Although Robert Adams and rvilliam \fainwright are officially on record
with a_ negadve answer to dris quesdon,lT I'ir inclined to agree with
Rowe here. Given that we understand the 'best' worrd as tf,e world
that has the greatest overall combination of value, then ir seems ro me
that if God is essentially perfectly good, then God wiil want to bring
about the best overall state of affairs that he can. Now perhaps the best
overall world is not the world with the happiest o, ,rroit beautiful and
or supremely gifted inhabitana; perhaps the best overall world is a world
in which there is ample room for grace and unmerited love (as Adams
and \Tainwright think). But on the assumption that some creaable world
contains uniquely the best overall combination ofvalue, then God's perfect
goodness would seem to insure that God would have the wil to bring that
world about. In any event, for the purpose of this paper, I don't inteird to
deny this.
IV.B. If, necessarily, God brings about the best creatable world,
does that imply that God isn't &ee?
Rowe is rrpfront about his incompatibilist sensibility: the fact that Godqmnot refrain from creating the best world guaraniees that God is not
free with respect to creating that world. Howiver, despite Rowe's carefirl
reasoning, I find that if I am not keeping his argumeni firmly in mind, I
can lose TI grip on just how it is that God lacks the requisite Fr""do*.
In an effon to look at the issue from another angle, leJs think about what
the theist says about how divine acrs are produced.ls Being omniscient, God
knoys jn any given situation what the best thing is for Cod to do. re Being
perfectly good, God will want to do the action that is best. Furthermore]
God's omnipotence surely requires that God will have the ability to bring
about the best that God can do in a given situatio.r. Suppore, tlen, ii
circumstance C, doing X is the best thing that God 
""" 
d". Then God
will know that doing X is the best available acrion, and God wiil want to
perform it. since God will have no competing desires (say from inclination
or simple self-interest) to thwan God's desire io do the best thing, and since
t7 {dams (1972) andVunwright (1996).ta Points similar to some of those I am making in the discussion that follows can be
found in l7iereng (2002).
te Stricdy'tfie best'here is the best that the being is able to do at the time"
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God is perFecdy rational, God will form the volirion to do X. And since
nothing exrernal can srop God from doingwhat God intends, God will do
X. So we've deduced that God will do X from the assumption rhat God
is omniscient, perfectly good, omnipotenr, and rarional. Now so far our
only conclusion is simply thar God will do X and from rhar proposition
no immediate inferences can be drawn about God's freedom.
As we have seen above, the problem is that a sffonger conclusion can
be argued for. For, if it is the case that given God's essendal attributes,
there is no world at which God fails to bring about the best oeation thar
he can, then it is necessary that God bring about the best world he can.2o
Furtherrnore, even if God exhibits these properties in only a stable manner,
then there will be no worlds accessible to God at which God refrains from
doing God's best. And from that conclusion, togerher with the libertarian
assumption that freedom requires the ability to refrain in precisely the same
circumstances, a conclusion abour God's lack of freedom apparently does
follow.
'While 
recognizing *re srrengrh of the intuition that lead philosophers
to claim that freely doingA requires the abiliry to refrain from doing A in
the very circumstances of the action, I can also feel the pull of thinking
of God's acrions as free even though God fails rhe'can refrain'condidon.
Perhaps a litde reflection on the reasons for the'can refrain' condition will
help us understand why God's failing that condition might not be so prob-
lematic.
There are, I think, three kinds of cases that strongly motivare rhe 'can
refrain' condition. They are: (a) rhe problem of past causally sufficient
condirions for the acrion rhar not only pre-date the volition ro perform
the action trut pre-date the exisrence of the actor; (b) concerns about
manipulation by other agenrs; and (c) worries about internal compulsions
(e.g., addiction/psychokrgical disorder cases).
Regarding (a): if events thar occur billions of years before I was born,
together with laws of nature that were also in place billions of years before
I was born, conspire ro s€r in morion a sequence of events that are causallv
sufficient For my performing A, the claim thar I am neverrheless doing A
freely seems far fetched. Why? Because I did not exist when the mamer of
my doing A was settled. Notice, however, that in rhe case of God's doing
X there are no conditions or events spaddly or tempordly prior to God
which dercrmine God's acrions. Yes, God couldn't refrain from X-ing in
circumstance C but there is no set of past series of evencs and causal laws
that is responsible for this.
zf 
.Keep in mind rhat we are assurning in dris secdon ofthe paper that there is a best
world and that there is not an infinite seiies oFincreasingly good worlds.
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Regarding (b): This discussion can be very quick. If my performing
a ceftain acdon is the result of my being manipulated by a nefuious
neurosurgeon, devious hypnotist, or controlling creator, then the ultimate
cause of my actions is the intentional state the agent who has programmed
me. My actions aren't free because another 
€ent is the source of them.
Needless to say, this freedom-compromising condition isn't relevant to the
volitions and actions of the omnipotent Source of Being.
Regarding (c): Since God is perfecdy rational and his volitions and actions
ar€ produced by his recognition ofthe best course ofaction and his desire
to do the best, there can be no worry rhat God's actions are the result of
analogues of human cognitive malfunction brought on either by addiction
or psychological disorder. Notice too that the claim that God always does
the best because it is the best isn't to be understood as God's having some
kind of non-rational, knee-jerk response to the goodness of the action
in question. Rather, God's reason for having the volition God has, and
for performing the action God does, is God's recognition of the reasons for
performing the action in question, God's knowing and appreciating all the
reasons for refraining from that action, and God's seeing that the reasons
for performing the action are weightier than the reasons for refraining. It's
God's understanding of the reasons that leads God to act as God does.
So three primary motivations that lead libertarians to insist that our
&eedom requires the ability to refrain are simply out of place where God is
concerned. That is to say, God's volitions and actions will pass those drree
tests even though God lacla the abiliry to refiain from doingwhat God sees
as the best thing m do.
\$7hile a libertarian will rypically insist that freedom requires the abiliry
to refrain, she will not offer that as a complete analysis of free action. In
fact, I can see no reason for a libertarian to not agree with the compatibilist
rhat what we might call 'effective choice' is a necessary condition for free
action. One has effective choice regarding an action A if and only if one
can do Aif ou so wilhand refrain from doingA if one uills.2t A free action
would seem to require that my action be able to reflect my volitions. Yer
libenarians believe that it's not enough that a person be able to do A if
zt ThisphrasingcomesftomJonathanEdwards(amongothers).SeeEdwards(1957).
Unrclated to Edwards, a teferee commenting on an earlier version of this paper has
noted that this condition needs the addidon of the requirement that it be possible thet
either one will A or rhat one will that one not do A. For without that condition, onc has
effective choice over actions one can neither will to do nor will to refiain fiom doing
and that is (to say the least) implausible. I agree with the reader but make the point only
in a footnote inbrder to keepin focu theiondition in the text. Of course, in the case
at hand, this addition is not a problem: there is no quesdon about it being possible for
God to have the relevant will.
I184 Thornas Senor
she wills and refrain from doing A if that's what she wills. For, if her will
is determined by events outside her conuol, then her acdon won'r be free
even if she would be able ro acr on a different will if she had one.
so, even if God's creating the best world is necessary (or at least
unavoidable) given God's narure, the theist can still craim that God's
creative act satisfies the following conditions:
God has effective choice over his creative decision (i.e., compatibilist
freedom);
Neither the volition to creare nor the creative act is strictly the result
ofan antecedent causal condition that predates God,s existence;
God's creadve action is not *re result of a non-rationar internal
force.
Notice that regarding human agena in a deterministic world, the best that
could be said is that conditions (i) and (iii) would hold. That is, the tlree
conditions could not be satisfied by an agent in a deterministic world; so a
morg ggngral account of dre nature of freedom along the lines of (t-(iii)
would be libertarian. However, the addict who can'tLis th. temptation
to take druss and persons with psychological compulsions are not free with
respect to volitions/actions produced by their addiitions/compulsions, since
those actions are the result of non-rational, internal forces. 'ihe same goes
for various unfonunate (although fictitious) individuals whose volitionsld
actions are the result oFnefarious neurosurgeons or hypnotists.
The upshot of all of this is that given ihat Godt-creative act satisfies
the above three conditions, why should God's inabiliry to refrain require
us to deny that God's act is free? For what does the 'inabilitv to ,.doirr'
.ome to here other than the inability to act against what he iras ttre best
rslson to do? can we really say God would only be free in this context if
God were to be able to act against what God sees as the clearly best thing
to {o, the thing that he has every reason to do and no good reason notto do? That is, that divine freedom would entail the poJiuiti.y of divine
irrationaliry?
IV.C. If God is not free, is God not appropriately thanked
or praised?
Even if what I've suggested above is wrong and its being necessary tiat
God performs an action entails that God is not free with-respect to rh"t
acrion, I don't think ir follows that God is not to be thankei or praised.
In panicular, I think that the idea that God's praisewonhiness depends on
God's having the freedom to refrain from the good God does is plausible
only if one has a needlessly narrow view of what-praisewonhiness 
"orrr., 
,o.
D efending D iu ine Fre edo rn
I'm perfectly willing ro granr that morul praiseworthiness for an action
A requires that the agent who performs the acdon was not caused to do
the action by events independent of her character and motivations. As
we have seen in the last pan of this section, however, this condition of
praisewonhiness c:ln be satisfied by God even if God necessarily does the
best (and *rey are not satisfied by anyone whose actions are determined by
the past and laws of nature).
Now it might be argued that there is another condition of moral
praisewonhiness thar God can't satisfy: that an agent who is praiseworthy
might have done things that are wrong or at least not the best the agent
could do. Given what I said above, I tlink there is anuse ro be dubious of
this condition. But let's waive such scruples and suppose rhat this condition
is right. If it is, then God is not morally praisewonhy. But it hardly follows
from this that God is not praiseworthy in some other sense. And I believe
that it is another sense of praiseworthiness that is paramount in the theist
tradition.
'W'lren theists claim tlrat God is to be praised, they often distinguish this
from saying that God is to be thanked. \7try? Because God is to be praised
for who God is; God is to be thanked for what God has /aaa. Now God's
praisewonhiness is,surely not just a function ofour helplessness before God,
of God's ability to do with us as God will. If God were a finite, although
very powerful, tyrant, God would be able to dispose of us according to
his pleasure but God would not be thereby praiseworthy. \fhat makes
God praisewonhy includes his awesome power-the fact that not only is
there no being as powerful as God but tlnt there could not be a being as
powerful since God is the source of all power. While sheer power might
make a being literally awesome, it wouldn't make it praisewonhy. What
makes God praisewonhy is God's power together with God's narure as fair,
merciful, and loving-God's embodying all that is valuable. God's nature
as both the source of all that is and as a benevolent Creator is what makes
God worthy of our praise. This sense of praisewonhiness does depend on
God's naturally treating us a certain way,.but it does not depend on God's
feely treatingus that w^y-at least not if such freedom requires the ability
to refrain from ueating us as God does. Even if God isn't strictly speaking
a moral agtnt because God isn't ruictly speaking a fitting subject of mora-
praise because God isn't free regarding the good things God does, God is
nevenheless metaphysically praisewonhy if he is the ground of all being
and power and yet treats zuch finite, fawed beings as ourselves with love,
kindness, and mercy. I submit that when theists offer their praise to God
in worship, they ate not intending to praise God as a moral agent but as
rhe loving, benevolent source of dl being and power. Offering praise to the
hero who saves lhe small child's life at great peril to her own well-being,
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and offering praise to God for being the loving Creator of the Heavens and
Earth is not to offer the same thing rc different individuals. The human
hero has done something for which she is praisewonhy; God is praiseworrhy
in virtue of being.\7lro God is.
So much for praisewonhiness. What about thankfulness? Should we
think that if God does not have the power to refrain from the blessings God
bestows on us, then God is not ro be thanked? I think the answer to rhis
is 'clearly not'. Suppose that you have a benevolent aunr who frequendy
sends you gifts. Suppose yru knew that this woman did whar she did was
because of her upbringing and very strong religious convictions. Indeed,
suppose you knew that given your relative need and her relative plenry, her
reladonship to you, and her belief in the importance of giving (particularly
to family) she was not really able to resist giving you generous gifts.'Would
your understanding of her situation release you of a dury to thank her for
her kindness toward you? Of course not. 'We owe our beneficiaries a debr
of thanls when, motivated by a concern for our well being, they besrow
benefits upon us. In fact, it might be that the condition that the gift is
given out of a 'concern for our well being'is overly restrictive. If I have a
self-serving uncle who gives me a gift primarily because it will provide him
with a significanr tax write o6 I still have a dury ro thank him provided
rhat he was able to see rhat the gift would benefit me. His action needn't be
praisewonhy; it must only be an undeserved benefit to mc.
I conclude, then, that it is not evident that God's inabiliry to refrain from
creating makes God unfree; still less is it wident rhat God's lack of creative
freedom (if God indeed does lack such freedom) is inconsistent with God's
praisewclrthiness or the appropriateness ofour offering thanks for his tender
mercies.
V. PREMISE ONE-EITHER THERE IS A BEST
\TORLD OR THERE IS AN INFINITE HIERARCHY
OF BETTER \TORLDS
In frirness to Rowe, Iet me begin by noting that he never asserts premise
one. In fact, Rowe mentions brielly a third option and credits Thomas
Morris with suggesting a fourth. However, Rowe spends almost no time
elaborating either of these other cwo possibilities, or on exploring dreir
implicadons for his argument. The first he dispenses widr in a footnote and
the second gcts no discussion at all after being mentioned. In this secdon,
we'll look at what can be said for each of rhese possibilities and what irnpact
they have on Rowe's conclusion.
In addidon to the two options mendoned in the first Premise' there is the
possibiliry that drere is no uniquely best world because there is more than
one *o.ld with precisely the same, unsurpassed level of goodness. That
is, there might be a de at the top. Recognizing that this is an epistemic
possibility, we should ask rwo questions: how plausible is the claim that
th.r. ir a de for best world *rat, if it were true, would help the theist out of
Rowe's problern?
One reason for thinking there might be a tie is discussed by Rowe
when he considers Aquinas'view that there is an infinite hierarchy of good
worlds.22 one might think, Rowe says, rhat such a series is irnpossible since
each world will contain God, who is infinitely good and absolutely perfect.
So everyworld (or at least weryworld with God) will be infinitely good' So
there is a massive tie-every world with God is precisely as good as every
other: each is infinitely good.
Rowe's reply to this line of reasoning depends on making a distinction
berween quaniitative and qualitative goodness, and then claiming that,
while every world with God will contain an infinite quantity of goodness,
wori<is might yet differ with respect rc rhe quahty of gogdlesl I haven't
the space i"t.-to get into the details, but I will say that I find Rowe's replv
lnery uncontnincittg. For, however compelling is the claim that any world
with God containi an inf ite (and so eqtal) quanti4' of goodnes will be
matched equally, I would think, by the claim that any world with God
conudns 
"r, 
i.tfini." (and so equal) quality of goodness. Rowe denies this
and thinks it plausible that worlds with agreater diversiry of kinds of lreings
will contain 
" 
gr.*,.. qualiry of goodness rhan worlds with fewer kinds
of beings, 
"ln"tiif all worlds also contain 
God. Therefore, Rowe thinla,
the chit that dl worlds are equally good because all contain the infinite
goodness of God can be reasonably resisted.
- \0rhether I'm correct that there is 
.iust as much reason to think that the
presence of God guaranrees a rie in qualiry of goodness as it does a tie in
iuantity ofgoodttess, or Rowe is correct in thinking thar greater ontological
di,r"rsiry 
"*i """oun, for an increase in qualiry is, in 
the end, not ofgreat
importance. For there is, I belieYe, a bemer response to the argurne"t Yt "I"
noi considering for the Tie at the Top thesis. Although there |s n9 {ou!t
that in adding up the total goodness of a world that includes God, God's
goodness 
-ut, b. part of the equation,- there is no reason to include
bod's goodness when comparing the worlds that God can bring about since
22 T'tris disclssion begins near the borom in Rowe (2004: 39) and nrns through the
top halfofpage 44.
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every world God can bring about is, obviously, a world tlat includes God.
So there is simply no reason to include (and good reason ro exclude) God's
goodness when evaluating and comparing worlds.
Another way to make rhis point is ro say rhar the relwant unir of
comparison is 'possible crearions' rather than 'possible worlds'.23 kibniz's
claim that God would bring about the best possible world can (and probably
should) be recast as the claim that God would produce the best possible
creation. Since theism insists on the uanscendence of God, and on God's
being distinct from creation, there is here no concern that all possible
creations will be infinitely good because they each contain God; no possible
oeation includes rhe Creator as a paft. And with the God out of the picrure
(so to speak), there is no worry (at least as far as I can tell) that all crearions
will contain the same quantiry and qualiry of goodness. Because the phrase
'best possible world' is so entrenched in the discussion of the issues we are
concerned with here, I will not avoid using it in the remainder of this paper.
But it should be understood that, e.g., rhe claim 'God will bring about the
best possible world'is shonhand for'God will bring about the best creation
he is capable of bringing about (i.e., thebest fearibb creation)'.
So we are back where we sraned at the beginning of this secdon: can we
rule out the apparent epistemic possibility drat there is no single best world
because there is more than one world with unsurpassed goodness. Even if it
is not true that every world is ded for the 'best world' dtle, why should we
assume that either a single world is best or else every world is surpassable?
Is there any re:non to rule out the possibiliry that there ar€ rwo or more
unsurpassable worlds?
One might think that, while it can't be entirely ruled our, the claim
that there is a tie for the 'best world' designation is pretty implausible. I
mke it that Rowe thinls this and that is why he only briefly mentions this
possibiliry and in the end discusses it only in a footnote. Fio*"u.r, I want
to defend the rie possibility as being every bit as plausible as the best world
hypothesis. In fact, I want ro say something stronger: if both the infinite
hierarchy thesis and the founh possibiliry (which we will discuss in the next
part of this section) are false, then the tie hypothesis is true. That is, the one
possibiliry thar seems very, very unlikely is that there is a single best world.
Here's why.
\7hat it would take for a world to be the best world is for the amount of
value at that world to be greater than that ar every other world. The best
world isn't the world with the greatest volume or densest mass or rhe one thar
lasts longest; the criterion for'best'world is a function of world value. Now
2r. In keeping yfr *, earlier point, it is acnrally 'feasible' rather than .possible'
creaflons tnat are relevant here.
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one would assume that moral vdue is a major player here, but there is
no good reason to think it is the only one. That is, given the plausible
assumpdon ofvalue pluralism (i.e., there is more than one irreducible kind
of vdue), the best world would likely include whatever other kinds of
value there might be as well. That is, it would be the world that contained
the highest arnount and qualiry of value or values possible. Now, as I
understand it, this is the sole criterion on which worlds are judged in the
'best possible world' competidon. Any aspect of a world that doesn't make
a value difference is irrelevant. But now suppose there is a world \71 that is
a prima facie candidate for being the best world: it has an extremely large
quantiry of extremely high-qualiry goodness, and very litde (if any) wil.
In fact, let's stipulate thatVl's net goodness is unsurpassed. kt's go one
step further. \Vl is not only unsurpassed in net goodness, but there is no
possible way of combining values in a world tlnt is equal to the way those
values are combined in \fi. Put slightly differendy, any way of combining
values other than the way they are combined in\U7l will produce lower
net value than that found in lVl. So we are supposing (for the sake of
discussion) that there is a unique best way to combine values to get the
ultimately valuable world and that Wl is it.
So far, it looks as though \71 has a good claim to be the bem possible
world. However, consider world W2: \72 is just like 'S71 in every way except
that 1V2 contains one more item than S7l conains, and this item makes
no value difference in V2. (W2 may contain an extra elementary particle,
s,ry, or maybe an extra chair or blade of grass.) Or consider '\7'3' again
the value equivalent of Wl and W2, but whose underlying non-normative
'stuff is a different kind than what is found in'!71 and W2. That is''W3
realizes all and only the vdue properties that Wl and V2 realizn, but these
propefties supervene on a different type of rea\zing base. If either'\72 or
\J(/3 is possible, then dthough the value of Wl will be unsurpassed, and
ir will represent the best possible instantiation of value properties, it will
not be the uniquely best possible world since V2 and !7'3 are equally
as good. It would be helpful if I knew of a proof for the generd thesis
that for any world \tr, if W exhibits the specific combination of realized
value properties V, there is another world !7" that also exhibits V but
which differs from \07 in some non-normative asPect. Howwer, I know
of no such argument. Neverthess, the claim that the best combinadon of
value could be had by worlds *rat differ in trivial, non-nornurtive ways is
highly plausible, and we should conclude that it is more likely that there-is
more than one unsurpassably good world than it is that there is a single,
best world.
'What is the impact of this on Rowe's argument? One the one hand,
it seems potentially significant. For Rowe apparendy thinls that the two
191
"T
l
I
190 D efndi ng D i u i ne Freednm
primary options are those menrioned in the first premise. And were those
options to have exhausted the possibilities, Ro*e has arguments in place
that eirher God is not free or nor perfcctly good (i.e., thatihere is no God).
But, if there are multiple best worlds, then God's perfect goodness, wisdom,
and power will not guaranree that actualiry of any partiiular world. God's
freedom, it would seem, will not be in jeopardy. futhough Rowe spends
very little time considering the Tie at the Top hypothesis, he doesn't ignore
it completely. He makes rwo points in response. Here's the first:
[]f there is a best action for God to perform (e.g., creating the best world), God
creates the best world of necessity not fieely. And just as clearlv, if there are
alternative best worlds for God to perform, he will of necessity, not freely, create
one of them.2{
on the assumption that a null creation (i.e., a world at which God doesn't
create anyrhing) wouldn't be among the alternative best possible creations,
Rowe is certainly correcr that God's creating drat world ls necessary (or at
least unavoidable). wrether it is rierefote nor fre. is not so obvious (as I
argued in dre last secrion). And as we'll see in the nexr part of the next
section, it isn't clear that the null world is not as good as oiher worlds God
could make.
- 
The seco_nd point Rowe makes about the Tie at the Top hypothesis is
found in a footnote. Here's what Rowe says:
Even though there being several creatable worlds rhan which there are none berer
appea-rs to leave God free ro create any one of these worlds, swinburne and
other proponents ofthis view are still burdened with having to defend the rather
implausible claim that the acrual world with all its evil is a wodd than which it is
logically impossible that there should be a better world than it.2t
It should be noted that, for reasons that have already sur6ced, the theist
who adopts the Tie at the Top hypothesis is not necessarily saddled with this
consequence. A Molinist can_ follow Plantinga in claiming that it is possible
drat the best worlds are not feasible worlds because the trire co,rnterfa.tual,
of freedom make them such that even an omnipore't being cannot weakly
ac:.rnlize them. so, ar most, the Molinist is committed to tlie claim that the
actual world is one of the best feasible worlds.
There is a related concern for the theist if the Tie at the Top hypothesis is
correcr because tlre best combination of values can be instaniiaiei in mor.
than one world- God's 'free choice' among the various b"st worlds would
be analogous to the freedom one would h; i[ needing a box ofbreakfast
cereal, one went to the rown's only store to find that*there were a grear
many different boxes of the same size of Cheerios and nothing else. True,
one would did not have to buy the box of cered one bought, but one's
freedom is stricdy superficial.
Now if the Tie at the Top hypothesis is true not because there is a single
best combination of values that can be instantiated in more than one world,
but because rhere is more than one possible combination of values that
lead to maximd value in a world, then God's choice among the worlds
would be more significant. For example, suPPose there are exacdy two
unsurpassable worlds X and Y, and that both are equal in overall value. X'
however, contains slightly more instances of autonomy (which I assume is
component ofoverall value) but fe.wer instances ofaltruism (which I assume
is also a component of overall value) than Y contains. Now God's choice
between X and Y seems more significant than it would be if there is a single
combination of value that can be instantiated either in wodds that don't
contain precisely the same objects or in worlds with value-supervenience
bases that are distinct while the supervenient values are precisely the same-
For although X and Y are equally good worlds, the value difference benveen
them is not trivial. God might prefer worlds with greater alrruism to worlds
with greater alrronomy even though God recognizes that the overall value
of the worlds is the same. so a tie of this son does not lead to insignificant
choices or to a freedom that is essentially meaningless. It's rhe difference
between having only the choice of which of nrany exactly similar boxes of
Cheerios to buy on the one hand, and having a choice beween your nro
favorite cereals on the other. You might think the two are equally as good,
but on a given day have a preference for one. Given your preference, your
freedom here is not uivid.
V.B. Incommerisurate worlds
premise one of Rowe's argumenr is false if rwo or more worlds are tied for
having the greatest value. However, there is another way that this premise-
could-be falr.' there rnight be worlds that.are simply incommensurate.-If
rhat is the case then there is neither a best world nor an infinite hierarchy
of good worlds.
FIow plausible is the thesis that there are incommensurable worlds? That
depends, I would think' on whether or not value monism is true. If there is
". 
Lo,.orn one rype of value, then it would seem that for any worlds A and
B, Awould be beiter than, worse than, or equal to B. For example, if Millian
utilitarianism is true, then happiness is the only irreducible value. so dre
value o{:a world is strictly a function of thcl net happiness at that world.
If that is riglrt, then surely there are no two worlds that are incommen-
suf.ate.
Thomas Senor
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Value monism, however, is not a very plausible thesis. And, if it is false,
if value pluralism is true, then there would seem to be the possibiliry of
incommensurabiliry. Thar's nor ro say that very instance of difi,cerenr value
would always been incomparable to other insrances. For example, if we were
to compare the value of the doodle on my page of notes wirh *rat of the
sacrifice a war hero makes for his country, there would be little doubt that
the doodle would lose: the value of the war hero swamps the insignificant
value of my doodle. Still, arguably, the value of a great work of art and
the value of a mordly very good (but not truly heroic) action might well
be thought to be incomparable-even if the value of a great work of art
loses out ro thar of a ruly heroic action. Although both rhe great work
of art and the morally very good (but not heroic) action are insnnces of
significant value, since their values are of fundamentally different rypes, ir's
plausible m think that they cannor be put on the same scale. There is, of
course, a sense in which they can be compared since they can bot} be seen
to-have significant value. However, from the recognition rhat each is greatly
valuable it does not follow that either is beffer, worse, or equal to rhetther.
Given value pluralism, there are a number of fundamental, irredu-
cible, intrinsic values. I assume that any best world candidate will be
a world that exemplifies dl rhe sorts of fundamennl value that there
are. In many qrses, both with respect to wodd s€gmenm and even
whole worlds, these segmenm/worlds are commensurate-i.e., the state of
a{hirs of John's consrructing a somewhar artistic doodle is less good
than that of John's saving the life of a child. But not all cases 
"t tit .this. ?erhaps in situations where the quantitative and qualitative values
of values of fundamentally differenr rypes reach a certairr threshold, therejust is no way of comparing the state of affairs on a better than/less
than/equal to scale. So there is a whole host of ways thar values can
be combined to get the overall value of a world. Indeed, given the fini-
titude of human powers of conception, rhere are likely possible values thar
we simply don'r have the conceprual wherewithal to appreciate. Given
a non-rrivial number of disdncr intrinsic values (including those, if any
there are, that either aren'r instandated in our world or-th", *e dont
irave the capability of recognizing) and all the ways that these values
can be instantiated in a world, why shouldn't we think that there wili
be many possible total combinations that are incommensurate? Indeed,
perhaps there are an infinite number of incommensurably good worlds.
And even if rhat seems unlikely, this much can be said: *. h".,n" .ro
good reason for rhinking that there are nor any number ofvery good but
incommensurate worlds. If there are ev€n two, t-hen it's neitherthe case
that God's choice berween them is forced nor that for any world God
creates, God could have made one thar was bemer.
Now, even if all the above were to work' it might be thought that
we've still got the general problem of creation: was God free with resPect to
creating at all? If there are, say, a dozen incommensurate, very good creatable
worlds, then won't God necessarily bring about one of those? As far as I
can see, the answer to this last question is 'yes'. But that doesn't bring along
the conclusion that God necessarily creates unless it is also true that the
null creation is not one of the very good incommensurate worlds. But why
shouldn't it be? Perhaps a world in which the only existent is a necessary,
absolutely perfect being is incommensurate with a very good world that
includes such a being but that also includes causally-dependent, contingent,
non-perfect enrities. Even ifrhis claim doesn't strike one as self-evident or
obviously true, what reason do we have for thinking that it is false? And if we
think we can jrct see that a world with just God is of less value (is less good)
than at least some worlds with God and contingent, created things' what
is this confidence based on? I'm not suggesting vaiue scePticism in general.
Perhaps what I have in mind could be qlled something like 'epistemic
humiliry regarding the value of worlds'. Vhile the judgement that a-world
that includes an overwhelming amount and qualiry of pain and suffering
with relatively few (if any) oFsetting goods is inferior to a world in which
the same inhabiants have little pain and suffering, much deep happiness'
and there are a great number of other goods each had in abundance is
unassailable, the more standard worlds each with a wide variery of different
goods and 'bads'will be much more difficult to judge. One reason for this,
if 
"oorr", 
is the vastness of worlds and the puniness of the human mind'
\7e might not be in a position to make reliable judgements even when
there are facts of the maner rega.rding the relative value of worlds. There
is, however, a second potential reason for the difficulry we have in judging
the comparative goodness of worlds. My proposal is that one reason for our
inabiliryto make judgements in many of these cases is rhat such worlds are
in fact incommensurable.
So if there ar€ two or more incommensurate, very good, creatable worlds,
and one of those worlds is a world with only God, then God can be free
(in the srrong, libertarian sense) both with respect to creating at all and
with respect to which world to create if God creates. For God's nafllre'
togetheiwith God's options for creation will leave open the possibiliw
of-God's not creadng at all, and they will also be consistent with God's
bringing about any of ,h. itt*--ensurable creations. Notice too that if
God-does have a choice berween multiple, incommensurable crearions, then
God's choice is significant. For there can be substantial value differences in
incommensurable worlds. The example of the values of the grear work ofarr
and rhe morally good action serves to illustrare this. If each is valuable (or
even very valuabli), but because their values are ofsuch different kinds, they
r'
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are incommensurate, there is a basis for a preference, 
€ven a value-based
preference. This is the point we discussed in the last paragraph of Section
V. A regarding the possibility of distinct-but-equal combinations of overall
value. Only the possibility in t-his section seems considerably more plausible:
its not that there is a tie at t*re top, but that there are very good worlds whose
value is incomparable. In such a case, God has the freedom to choose among
rhese worlds and his choice can be grounded in what he happens to prefer.
Now if his preferences a.re necessary, then we will have a problem pardlel
ro that of the best world scenario. Although there will nor be a single best
world, if fiere is a world that is necessarily preferred by God, then God will
necessarily create it. But there is no reason to build such preferences into
rhe nature of God. So his creating one of the very-good-incommensurate
worlds can be free and yet substantial.
CONCLUSION
\Tilliam Rowe's argumenr that God must either not exist or not be free is
wir:hout a doubt very powerful. It richly deserves the significant attention it
has received. However, I believe that there is some reason to doubt each of
the argument's premises, and to also be suspicious of Rowe's claims about
the consequences of the Creator's being eirher not free or not perfecdy
good. Furthermore, I believe that dre incommensurate wodds possibiliry
is rather plausible, and if it turns out to be right, then God's crearing rhe
world God created, as well as God's having created at all, can be free and
significantly so in a way that does not compromise God's perfect goodness.
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